{"id":60455,"date":"2024-11-23T09:14:08","date_gmt":"2024-11-23T06:14:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/packetstormsecurity.com\/files\/182753\/NBL-001.txt"},"modified":"2024-11-23T09:14:08","modified_gmt":"2024-11-23T06:14:08","slug":"apple-web-content-filter-bypass","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/afaghhosting.net\/blog\/apple-web-content-filter-bypass\/","title":{"rendered":"Apple Web Content Filter Bypass"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Dear colleagues,<\/p>\n<p>Nosebeard Labs is pleased to share its latest advisory, detailing a <br \/>bypass of Apple&#8217;s system wide web content filter. The HTML version of <br \/>this advisory is also available at:<br \/>https:\/\/nosebeard.co\/advisories\/nbl-001.html<\/p>\n<p>Warmest regards,<br \/>Nosebeard Labs<\/p>\n<p>## Summary<br \/>Nosebeard Labs Security Advisory NBL-001<br \/>Title: Apple web content filter bypass allows unrestricted access to <br \/>blocked content (macOS\/iOS\/iPadOS\/visionOS\/watchOS)<br \/>Advisory ID: NBL-001<br \/>Date: 2024-11-15<br \/>Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.1)<br \/>Affected Product: Safari on any Apple device with Screen Time enabled<br \/>CVE ID: CVE-2024-44206<\/p>\n<p>## Overview<br \/>Nosebeard Labs has identified a critical vulnerability in Apple\u2019s system <br \/>wide web content filter that allows a full bypass of content <br \/>restrictions. This vulnerability, which occurs specifically when Screen <br \/>Time\u2019s content filtering settings are enabled, permits users or <br \/>attackers to access restricted websites in Safari without detection. By <br \/>exploiting a misalignment between Screen Time\u2019s Access Control List <br \/>(ACL) and WebKit\u2019s URI validation, a specially crafted URI can <br \/>circumvent both layers of protection.<br \/>Apple has assigned CVE-2024-44206 to this issue and issued a fix for <br \/>macOS Sonoma 14.x, iOS\/iPadOS 17.x, watchOS 10.x, visionOS 1.x, Safari <br \/>17.x and up.<br \/>However, a fix is still pending for the backport channels.<\/p>\n<p>## Description<br \/>This vulnerability arises when the WebKit Cocoa layer in Safari ingests <br \/>a URI without performing comprehensive validation, combined with a <br \/>failure by the Screen Time ACL filter to recognize and block the <br \/>malformed URI. The flaw allows a crafted URI to bypass all Screen Time <br \/>content filtering settings, including deny\/allow lists and parental <br \/>content filters, providing unrestricted access to blocked content.<\/p>\n<p>## Affected Systems<br \/>This vulnerability affects all devices on macOS, iOS, iPadOS, watchOS <br \/>and visionOS platforms with Safari and Screen Time enabled, impacting an <br \/>estimated 250 million devices globally.<\/p>\n<p>## Attack Scenarios<br \/>The vulnerability can be exploited both locally and remotely:<br \/>1. Local Exploitation: Users can manipulate the address bar to manually <br \/>enter a crafted URI, bypassing Screen Time restrictions.<br \/>2. Network-Based Exploitation: Attackers can load restricted content <br \/>remotely by embedding a crafted URI within an iframe, bypassing <br \/>restrictions without requiring user interaction.<\/p>\n<p>## Impact<br \/>1. Confidentiality: Unrestricted access to restricted websites <br \/>compromises the confidentiality of content filtering controls, <br \/>potentially exposing sensitive or inappropriate material.<br \/>2. Scope and Integrity: This vulnerability spans across two separate <br \/>security mechanisms (Screen Time and WebKit), representing a critical <br \/>architecture-level issue. Additionally, accessing unsecured or unlogged <br \/>resources poses potential integrity risks.<\/p>\n<p>## CVSS Score<br \/>Vector: CVSS:3.1\/AV:N\/AC:L\/PR:N\/UI:N\/S:C\/C:H\/I:L\/A:N<br \/>Score: 9.1 (Critical)<\/p>\n<p>## Mitigations<br \/>Upgrade to the latest iOS\/iPadOS 17.x or 18.x \/ macOS Sonoma 14.x \/ <br \/>visionOS 1.x \/ watchOS 10.x \/ Safari 17.6 respectively. Users who are <br \/>unable to apply a fix can contact us for more info.<\/p>\n<p>## Vendor Response<br \/>Apple has issued CVE-2024-44206 and supplied a fix within WebKit; <br \/>however, a fix remains pending for iOS\/iPadOS version 16.x. We recommend <br \/>that Apple undertake further review to address the issue comprehensively.<\/p>\n<p>## Timeline<br \/>\u2013<br \/>Milestone:<br \/>2020-11-24 Vulnerability discovered internally at NBL<br \/>\u2013<br \/>Milestone:<br \/>2021-03-08 Initial disclosure to Apple Product Security<br \/>\u2013<br \/>2021-03-09 Apple Product Security recommends to open a bug report on <br \/>Feedback Assistant<br \/>2021-03-10 We opened a bug report on Feedback Assistant as advised by <br \/>Apple Product Security<br \/>2021-03-15 We follow-up by adding additional info to the open bug report <br \/>on F.A.<br \/>2021-08-16 We follow-up again referring Apple Product Security to open <br \/>ticket, stressing that the issue can be also demonstrated in their EU <br \/>Apple Stores<br \/>2021-08-24 We follow-up again to Apple Product Security, referring to <br \/>the previous follow-up<br \/>2021-08-25 Rejected by Apple Security &#8211; \u201cWe do not see any actual <br \/>security implications. We recommended reporting this issue via Feedback <br \/>Assistant\u201d<br \/>2024-03-18 NBL submits a second report 3 years later to appeal via Apple <br \/>Security Bounty Program, urging to re-evaluate, also providing PoC code<br \/>2024-03-19 Apple Security Research closes report &#8211; \u201cWe\u2019re unable to <br \/>identify a security issue in your report\u201d &#8211; \u201cScreen Time is not intended <br \/>to protect a device against manipulation\u201d &#8211; \u201cWe recommend reporting this <br \/>via Feedback Assistant\u201d<br \/>2024-04-02 Status of Bug Report on F.A. from 2021-03-10 \u201cOpen, Similar <br \/>Reports None\u201d<br \/>2024-04-03 We follow-up again asking Apple Security for a final <br \/>reassessment, providing a temporary workaround<br \/>2024-04-03 Apple Security recommends opening a bug report &#8211; \u201cST is not <br \/>intended to protect a device against manipulation\u201d &#8211; \u201cMDM profiles <br \/>provide configuration management but do not establish additional <br \/>security boundaries beyond what iOS and iPadOS have to offer.\u201d<br \/>2024-05-05 Initial contact with Joanna Stern of WSJ<br \/>2024-05-06 Referring PSIRT ticket # directly to an Apple PSIRT contact <br \/>via undisclosed SOC &#8211; no response<br \/>2024-05-28 Joanna Stern\/WSJ runs Apple through this<br \/>2024-05-29 Apple commits patches to Safari branch<br \/>\u2013<br \/>Milestone:<br \/>2024-06-05 Wall Street Journal addresses our finding in their article \u201cA <br \/>Bug Allowed Kids to Visit X-Rated Sites. Apple Took Three Years to Fix <br \/>It.\u201d by Joanna Stern<br \/>\u2013<br \/>2024-06-18 We follow-up again with Urgent request for re-evaluation to <br \/>Apple Product Security (\u201cAddendum\u201d)<br \/>2024-06-27 We follow-up on our follow-up Update Request Screen Time <br \/>Security Vulnerability Report (\u201cFollow-Up\u201d)<br \/>2024-07-23 Apple releases fix in iOS 17.6RC et al.<br \/>2024-07-26 Letter to Apple welcoming first fix, reiterating our <br \/>dedication to Responsible Disclosure, intended to coordinate further <br \/>disclosure process and close the affair asking them to give credit and <br \/>align to their SBP<br \/>\u2013<br \/>Milestone:<br \/>2024-07-29 Apple releases fixes for macOS Sonoma 14.6, iOS\/iPadOS 17.6, <br \/>watchOS 10.6, visionOS 1.3 and Safari 17.6, leaving iOS\/iPadOS 16.x <br \/>still affected.<br \/>\u2013<br \/>2024-07-31 Apple responds \u201cST is not intended to protect a device from <br \/>malicious manipulation, and bug reports on features like this are <br \/>therefore typically ineligible for credit or Apple Security Bounty <br \/>award. However, we\u2019d like to make an exception and award you USD (&#8230;)* <br \/>as a thank you for your report. Also, we\u2019d like to credit you on our <br \/>security advisory under the \u2018Additional recognition\u2019 section of the <br \/>page.\u201d *We were offered the minimum possible amount.<br \/>2024-08-01 We inquire about the bounty amount asking Apple to \u201ccomment <br \/>on our proposed evaluation under the CVSS metrics, sharing with us their <br \/>transparent assessment of the vulnerability under the terms and broad <br \/>criteria of the bounty program.\u201d<br \/>2024-08-01 Apple \u201cappreciates our suggestions, but CVSS scores are not <br \/>something that they publish to their security advisory.\u201d<br \/>2024-08-03 Patches merged with public WebKit branch<br \/>2024-08-19 We are reaching out to Apple again \u201cRinging the escalation <br \/>bell for the SBP team\u201d<br \/>2024-08-23 Apple Product Security advises a call<br \/>2024-09-10 Apple Security rejects adjustment of the bounty as \u201cout of <br \/>scope\/edge case policy\u201d in the call, offering a $20,000 charity donation <br \/>instead We request Apple to assign a CVE.<br \/>\u2013<br \/>Milestone:<br \/>2024-10-17 Apple follows-up with CVE-2024-44206 and an update to the <br \/>advisories<br \/>https:\/\/support.apple.com\/en-us\/120909<br \/>https:\/\/support.apple.com\/en-us\/120911<br \/>https:\/\/support.apple.com\/en-us\/120913<br \/>https:\/\/support.apple.com\/en-us\/120915<br \/>https:\/\/support.apple.com\/en-us\/120916<br \/>\u2013<br \/>2024-10-23 We follow-up one more time to request a further review of the <br \/>severity and reward<br \/>2024-11-02 NBL-001 advisory draft shared with Apple<br \/>2024-11-14 Apple requests naming their charity offer among bounty payout <br \/>details, leaving out further comments on the contents of the advisory <br \/>itself.<br \/>2024-11-15 NBL-001 published<\/p>\n<p>## Contact<br \/>For more information, please contact Andreas Jaegersberger or Ro <br \/>Achterberg from Nosebeard Labs at labs@nosebeard.co.<\/p>\n<p>## Special Thanks<br \/>Much love goes out to Joanna Stern for her incredible support in making <br \/>this happen.<br \/>We also want to thank Aaron Kaplan for the tailwind throughout the <br \/>journey and Arnoud Engelfriet for the rapid legal advice.<br \/>Buongiorno to the cap\u2019n &lt;3<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Dear colleagues, Nosebeard Labs is pleased to share its latest advisory, detailing a bypass of Apple&#8217;s system wide web content filter. The HTML version of this advisory is also available at:https:\/\/nosebeard.co\/advisories\/nbl-001.html Warmest regards,Nosebeard Labs ## SummaryNosebeard Labs Security Advisory NBL-001Title: Apple web content filter bypass allows unrestricted access to blocked content (macOS\/iOS\/iPadOS\/visionOS\/watchOS)Advisory ID: NBL-001Date: 2024-11-15Severity: &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[26],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-60455","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-vulnerability"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/afaghhosting.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/60455","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/afaghhosting.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/afaghhosting.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/afaghhosting.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/afaghhosting.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=60455"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/afaghhosting.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/60455\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/afaghhosting.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=60455"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/afaghhosting.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=60455"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/afaghhosting.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=60455"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}