CVE ID :CVE-2026-10665<\/p>\n
Published : July 12, 2026, 4:16 p.m. | 1\u00a0hour, 11\u00a0minutes ago<\/p>\n
Description :In Zephyr’s WireGuard subsystem (subsys\/net\/lib\/wireguard), wg_process_data_message() in wg_crypto.c linearizes an inbound transport-data payload into a fixed pool buffer of CONFIG_WIREGUARD_BUF_LEN bytes before decryption. The call net_buf_linearize(buf->data, data_len, pkt->buffer, …, data_len) passed the attacker-derived data_len as both the destination capacity and the copy length, defeating the function’s internal len = min(len, dst_len) bound. data_len is derived from the received UDP datagram length and is only lower-bounded by wg_ctrl_recv() (no upper bound). When data_len exceeds CONFIG_WIREGUARD_BUF_LEN \u2014 e.g. when the buffer length is lowered below the link MTU, on links with MTU above the buffer size, or via reassembled IPv4\/IPv6 fragments that exceed it \u2014 the underlying memcpy writes past the end of the pool buffer, an out-of-bounds write (CWE-787). The overflow occurs before the Poly1305 authentication check, so it requires only a valid receiver session index rather than a valid authenticator, and is reachable by a malicious or compromised peer (or an on-path attacker driving an established session) over the network, yielding remote memory corruption and at minimum a reliable denial of service. The defect was present in the WireGuard implementation shipped in Zephyr 4.4.0. The fix adds an explicit data_len > CONFIG_WIREGUARD_BUF_LEN rejection and corrects the linearize call to pass net_buf_max_len(buf) as the destination capacity.<\/p>\n
Severity: 7.4 | HIGH<\/p>\n
Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more…\u00a0<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
CVE ID :CVE-2026-10665 Published : July 12, 2026, 4:16 p.m. | 1\u00a0hour, 11\u00a0minutes ago Description :In Zephyr’s WireGuard subsystem (subsys\/net\/lib\/wireguard), wg_process_data_message() in wg_crypto.c linearizes an inbound transport-data payload into a fixed pool buffer of CONFIG_WIREGUARD_BUF_LEN bytes before decryption. The call net_buf_linearize(buf->data, data_len, pkt->buffer, …, data_len) passed the attacker-derived data_len as both the destination capacity and …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[26],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-81883","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-vulnerability"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/afaghhosting.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/81883","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/afaghhosting.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/afaghhosting.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/afaghhosting.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/afaghhosting.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=81883"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/afaghhosting.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/81883\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/afaghhosting.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=81883"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/afaghhosting.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=81883"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/afaghhosting.net\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=81883"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}